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GETTING THE INSIDER'S STORY OUT: WHAT
POIPULAR FIILM CAN TELL US ABOUT LEGAL
METHOD'S DIRTY SECRETS
by
Rebecca Johnson*
Ruth Buchanan**
I said there is no justice as they led me out the door and the Judge said,
"This isn't a court ofjustice, it's a court of law."
-Line from a Billy Bragg song, "Waiting on Remand," Worker's Playtime (1988)
In this paper, the authors seek to use the insights gained by viewing and
thinking critically about a range of Hollywood films to better illuminate the
disciplinary blindspots of law. Both law and film are viewed as social institu-
tions, engaged in telling stories about social life. Hollywood films are often
critical of law and legal institutions. Law is dismissive of its representation
within popular culture. However, the authors argue that law disregards cine-
matic cynicism about itself at its peril and that there is much to learn by tak-
ing cinematic portrayals of law very seriously---not as representations of the
truth of law, but as analogies for how law itself operates in constructing
truth. Indeed, the authors conclude by arguing that law requires a better con-
ception of itself as a culturally productive institution. Law, like film, is not
simply engaged in the finding of truth, but also more fundamentally in the
making of meaning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hollywood has long been obsessed with law, truth, and justice. In partic-
ular, Hollywood cinema has sought to trouble the correspondence between
law and justice that is presumed by most traditional approaches to legal
institutions and theory. A classic opposition between law and justice is
found in films such as Adam's Rib, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington and The
Man Who Shot Liberty Valance. The films work by creating a slippage
between what is cinematically represented as the essential truth of a matter
and a lesser, limited or distorted truth that the law is able to grasp. The dra-
matic tension turns on the desire that the "whole truth" be revealed so that
justice may be done. More recent films that trade (sometimes ambiv-
alently) upon this particular dichotomy include The Thin Blue Line, Thelma
and Louise and The Insider. Sometimes a heroic protagonist (like a Karen
Silkwood or an Erin Brockovitch) is able to save the day, stitching together
the threads of law and justice through extraordinary perseverance and at
great personal cost. Often, however, the legal system is seen as beyond
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redemption. Outlaw films, like Unforgiven or Thelma and Louise, dictate
that whatever measure of justice is to be seen will be in the hands of the
characters.
Legal academics have also been troubled by these questions for some
generations. Beginning with the insights of the legal realists in the first part
of the last century, scholars have sought to point out the slippages between
the ideals of law and its operation from many different perspectives.
Fem-crits and law and economics scholars may find themselves united on
little else, but their critiques of the operation of formal legal doctrine have
the same source. The discipline of law, as we describe below, has remained,
in some aspects, remarkably resilient to these critiques.
In the paper that follows, we seek to use the insights gained by viewing
and thinking critically about a range of Hollywood films to better illumi-
nate some of the more shadowy corners of our own discipline. While we
are not suggesting that film-makers have any better access to "truth" about
law than law professors, we do suggest that thinking about how both "jus-
tice" and the "real" are constructed in film will help us to see parallel pro-
cesses at work in the legal world. The paper begins with a two part
introductory section, in which we present the conceptual problematique of
the paper and review the extant scholarship on law and film. In the second
section, we examine three dimensions along which a new critical cinematic
legal methodology might be constructed. Ultimately, we argue that the dis-
cipline of law disregards cinematic cynicism about itself at its peril.
Indeed, we suggest that there is much to learn by taking cinematic portray-
als of law very seriously, not as representations of the "truth" of law, but as
analogies for how law itself operates in constructing truth.
II. THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW AND ITS CRITICS
A. Law, Truth and the Question of Meaning
This paper takes its inspiration (and its title) from the recent Hollywood
film (based on a "true story") in which a recently fired executive of a
tobacco company is convinced to go public with vital inside information
concerning the tobacco industry's purposeful manipulation of the addictive
properties of nicotine in their cigarettes by a deeply committed and strate-
gically adept producer for the CBS news program 60 Minutes. Despite the
producer's heroic efforts, the legal maneuverings of "big tobacco" manage
to obstruct the public airing of the insider's interview. The interview is
finally aired only when all the information has already become available to
the public and the credibility of the "insider" has been virulently attacked
in a personal smear campaign. While we will have more to say about this
film later, by way of introduction we would simply like to point out that the
story of The Insider directs our attention to a number of issues which we
are troubled by. Among other things, the film reveals the deep interpenetra-
tion between the institutions of popular culture (here, the world of news-
magazines and "infotainment") and law and invites us to consider the role
of the legal system in the search for "truth."
At a most fundamental level, both this paper and the film are about
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unpacking the role(s) law plays in the construction of social meaning.
While both law and film are institutions which have historically enjoyed, in
David Black's phrase, a "license to arbitrate the social imaginary," in nei-
ther case is this process particularly transparent. That is, the processes
through which these institutions shape our perceptions of the meaning of
things are neither generally acknowledged nor well understood. Legal
institutions form a significant part of the terrain on which struggles over
meaning take place and yet this paper will argue that scholars are hampered
in their ability to effectively account for the social role of law because the
discipline of law doesn't have an adequate conception of itself as a "mean-
ing-making" as opposed to a "truth-finding" institution. The Hollywood
film industry is not similarly constrained, and we will argue that rather than
dismissing movies about law for their lack of technical veracity (e.g.: the
"hearsay rule" did not work that way; a cross examining lawyer would
never ask a question to which she didn't know the answer), we may look to
films such as The Insider for the insights they provide into our own disci-
plinary blindspots. In the second part of this paper, we will identify and
explore three insights related to the construction of meaning: the role of
narrative; the role of "brute perception:" and the implications of audience
reception and multiple readings. To some extent, these insights track argu-
ments which have for some time been made by critical legal scholars, fem-
inists, critical race theorists and others. However, in this paper, we seek not
only to build on these critiques, but also to push them more firmly to the
centre of public dialogue concerning both law's claims to legitimacy and
its meaning-making function.
Our collaboration had its origins in an interdisciplinary project at the
University of British Columbia, a project whose main ambition has been to
examine a range of contemporary challenges to the process by which legal
knowledge is constructed, and thereby, to influence our collective under-
standings of the nature of that knowledge. One of the guiding premises of
that project is that despite considerable amount of social and legal change
over the course of the past several decades if not the past century, conven-
tional representations of the discipline of law have remained remarkably
unchanged. From the outside, legal institutions, the practice of law and the
law itself appear to have been dramatically transformed, yet from the inside
(inside law schools, and to a lesser extent, courtrooms and law offices) the
parameters of the discipline appear to have strayed little from their nine-
teenth century positivist roots. Even at the beginning of the 21 st century, in
the Canadian law schools where we spend our days, the law is convention-
ally understood as an autonomous, self-contained system of rules; to study
the "law" means to study legal doctrine as found primarily in case law and
statute; legal reasoning is taught as the primary "method" through which
legal doctrine is articulated and discussed. The method of legal reasoning is
presented as analogous to scientific reasoning; it is expected to aspire to the
same standards of objectivity and coherence.
While our description of legal positivism may well seem trite to others
"inside" the profession of law and law teaching, it will come as a surprise
to many laypersons, whose understanding of the law is drawn from popu-
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lar cultural texts such as John Grisham novels, or even notorious legal/
media events such the O.J. Simpson trial. This disjuncture is one of the
primary targets of this paper. As insiders to the discipline of law, we want
to blow the whistle on legal positivism. However, to outsiders, particularly
those versed in North American popular representations of law, legal insti-
tutions are hardly seen as the rational and objective truth-seeking bodies
that they purport to be. So, then, to whom do we seek to tell our story? We
are telling it to other insiders, but seeking to tell it using vehicles from the
outside, primarily mainstream film portrayals of [law and] legal institu-
tions. What we hope will be the result of our effort to turn law inside out
in this way is a necessary and significant re-visioning of its disciplinary
boundaries.
Disciplinary boundaries are almost always drawn around epistemologi-
cal questions. Law is not unique in this respect. Further, questions of what
count as "truth" in law, or what is legitimate legal knowledge, also engage
the fundamental question of "what is law?" Bourdieu has observed that the
stakes in a given field almost always engage the definition of the field
itself.1 In trying to engage with, and possibly redefine the parameters of
law as a discipline, we recognize that we are playing a dangerous game that
has serious consequences. However, we argue that the status quo, in which
the field is maintained through cynical or naive allegiance to the positivist
misconception, is also dangerous in different ways.
The legal positivist paradigm posits that "truth" can be identified
through legal process, which itself is understood as capable of unbiased
objective adjudication. Legal knowledge is that which is achieved, and is
achievable, through legal reasoning. If we try to press the positivist frame-
work a bit further, however, and ask whether legal knowledge is primarily
concerned with justice, truth or meaning, we encounter some problems.
Truth and justice, within positivism, are essentially the same thing. On the
other hand, the question of meaning, which we take to be embedded in the
larger question of the role of narrative, is subsumed to the truth/justice
dyad. The narrative element of law, which is undoubtedly present even in
the positivist vision, is somehow subsumed to the dictates of the truth/jus-
tice juggernaut.
If we are to cast ourselves in the role of "heroic" leaders of the charge for
a paradigm shift away from the vestiges of legal positivism, we need to
begin by re-imagining the relationship between truth, justice and meaning
in law. It doing that, we will be informed by a larger epistemic shift toward
an understanding of the links between social relations, power and truth; for
example, the ways in which Foucault revealed the production of knowl-
edge as an artifact of power relations.2 Clearly legal knowledge needs to be
able to perceive and account for the power relations which produce it and
in which it cannot but be implicated. As Black puts it, "what is chiefly at
I P. Bourdieu, "The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field" (1987) 38
Hastings L. J. 805.
2 M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977.
Trans. ed. by C. Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).
2001
Getting the Insider's Story Out
stake (in looking at law as a narrative regime) is not the question of
whether or not the various role players in the legal system tell stories
(which they do) but rather, the role that narrative plays with respect to the
further stakes of the legal process and legal power." 3 While our essay will
not focus on "power" per se, we recognize that the discussion of truth,
meaning and justice necessarily takes place in its shadow and hopefully
instructs us about its operation.
We have also been influenced by social theorists and cultural studies
scholars who have considered the links between representation and reality
in our media-saturated culture. These days, a working hypothesis about the
nature of legal knowledge needs to account for the ways in which represen-
tations bleed into and shape the reality they purport to reflect- much as in
the film, Wag the Dog, the Hollywood-produced representation of a war in
Albania, was seen to change political realities in Washington. As law/film
scholar Richard Sherwin observes, "What we commonly regard as 'truth'
is not easily divorced from fiction. Indeed, it often resides there ... fictional
models permeate factual discourse." 4 To relate this back to law, at one
level, this argument simply suggests that fictional models (narrative tropes,
stock characters and so on) pervade forms of legal argument and legal deci-
sion-making as well. Not that they subsume it, but that they do function in
particular ways within it, functions that we need to do a better job of
accounting for.
To sum up, we seek to relocate the discipline of law firmly in contempo-
rary culture; in a world in which it is commonplace to question linear nar-
ratives that seem to lead without difficulty to a particular "truth" of a
matter, to subvert claims to truth as being subject to radically variant inter-
pretations and to recognize the blurred boundaries between reality and rep-
resentation. 5 We understand now, in a way we perhaps did not 50 or 75
years ago, the extent to which subject positions (not to mention lighting
and camera angles) can shape the way an event is experienced and how a
narrative (legal or otherwise) is received. Films like The Thin Blue Line, A
Question of Silence, and even Thelma and Louise have illustrated the tenu-
ousness of law's claim to privileged access to truth, the troubled relation-
ship between narrative and truth, and even the limits of language itself. It is
to the realm of film we now turn, to examine some previous forays by legal
scholars into this dangerous, enchanting realm.
B. When Law Professors Go to the Movies: A Brief Overview
In recent years, an interest in popular culture has been making its way
3 D.A. Black, Law in Film: Resonance and Representation (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1999) at 35.
4 R.K. Sherwin. When Law Goes Pop: The Vanishing Line Between Law and Popular Cul-
ture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) at 47.
5 Particularly relevant and representative are B. Nichols, Blurred Boundaries: Questions of
Meaning in Contemporary Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) and V.
Sobchack ed., The Persistence of History: Cinema, Television, and the Modern Event
(New York: Routledge, 1996).
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into the legal academy. 6 Some have seen this as a natural extension of the
law and literature movement. It may well be that the law and literature
movement opened doors for the consideration of both popular culture gen-
erally and film in particular. We have seen the emergence of symposia
devoted to questions of law and the cinematic gaze 7 and edited collections
devoted to law in film. 8 However, while there is certainly a rise in attention
to film in legal writings, this scholarship does not yet seem to bear the hall-
marks of a "movement." One would, indeed, be hard pressed to identify
any unifying theory or approach in this body of writing. Rather, what one
sees is a number of quite different uses of film.
Sometimes, the concern is with realism and inaccuracy in the representa-
tion of law and lawyering. So, a writer may focus on artistic license taken in
movies about law (i.e. pointing out the errors in procedure, rules of evi-
dence, etc), 9 or direct attention to concerns such as the representation of
lawyers and lawyering, 10 of law and race1 ' or of female lawyers.' 2 Some-
times, questions about realism and inaccuracy in film are used as a vehicle
for discussing the nature of legal thinking and interpretation.' 3 And, in a yet
more complex turn, questions of accuracy and reality in film have also facil-
itated the turn towards an exploration of postmodern uncertainty in law.'
4
6 See e.g. (1989) 98 Yale L. J. 1545[Symposium: Popular Legal Culture]. While this phe-
nomenon has had a strong American bent, it has also been evident in the Canadian con-
text. See e.g. (1995) 10 Can. J. L. & Soc. [Symposium Issue on Law as Source of Popular
Culture and Popular Culture as Source of Law]. See e.g. (2000) 48 UCLA L. Rev. [Sympo-
sium on Law and Popular Culture].
7 See e.g. (1996) 30 U. San.Fran. L.R 4[Symposia on Picturing Justice: Images of Law and
Lawyers in the Visual Media]; M. Chon & M. Russell eds., Symposium on Race, Law aod
Film (1998) 5 Asian L.J. 1. [hereinafter Symposium on Race, Law and Film].
8 J. Denvir ed., Legal Reelism: Movies as Legal Texts (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1996) [hereinafter Legal Relism]; P. Bergman & M. Asimow, Reel Justice: The Courtroom
Goes to the Movies (Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1996) [hereinafter Reel Justice].
Both these texts are reviewed in D.H.J. Hermann, The Law. in Cinema, (1998) 52
N.Y.L.S.L.Rev. 305.
9 See Reel Justice, ibid.. Also see G.F. Uelmen, "The Trial as a Circus: Inherit the Wind."
(1996) 30 U. San Francisco L. Rev. 1111
10 J. Grant, "Lawyers As Superheroes: The Firm, The Client, and The Pelican Brief(1996)
30 U. San Francisco L. Rev. 1111.
S1 Symposium on Race, Law and Film, supra note 7.
12 There is a burgeoning literature exploring the representation of women lawyers in film.
See S. Caplow, "Still in the Dark: Disappointing Images of Women Lawyers in the Mov-
ies" (1999)20 Women's Ris. L. Rep. 55; L. E. Graham & G. Maschio, "A False Public Sen-
timent: Narrative and Visual Images of Women Lawyers in Film" (1995-96) 84 Kentucky
L.J. 1027; C. Shapiro, "Women Lawyers in Celluloid: Why Hollywood Skirts the Truth"
(1995) 25 U. Toledo L.R. 955; C. Shapiro, "Women Lawyers in Celluloid, Rewrapped
(1998) 23 Vermont L. Rev. 303; R. Sheffield, "On Film: A Social History of Women Law-
yers in Popular Culture 1930 to 1990" (1993) 14 Loyola of L.A. Entertainment LJ. 73;
C.A. Corcos "Portia and Her Partners in Popular Culture: A Bibliography"(l998) 22 Leg.
Stud. Forum 269.
13 Black notes the use of this strategy in R. Laurence, "Last Night While You Prepared for
Class I Went to See Light of Day: A Film Review and a Message to My First-Year Prop-
erty Students, Annotated for My Colleagues,"(1989) 39.J. Leg. Edu. 87.
14 Richard Sherwin has been particularly notable in this regard. See Sherwin supra note 4;
R.K. Sherwin, "Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative necessity in a Criminal
Case." (1994) 47 StanfordL. Rev. 39; R.K. Sherwin, "The Narrative Construction of Legal
Reality." (1994) 18 Vermont L. Rev. 681 [hereinafter Narrative Construction]; R.K. Sher-
win, "Picturing Justice: Images of Law and Lawyers in the Visual Media (Introduction)."
(1996) 30 U. of San Francisco L. Rev. 891.
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But the concern is not always with accuracy and inaccuracy. In some
cases, film serves as a vehicle for the writer's discussion of other legal
issues. So, for example, Menkel-Meadow looks at narratives about lawyers
in film (and literature and television) as a way of illustrating the ethics and
morality of lawyering.15 La Forest uses The Piano as a vehicle for discuss-
ing issues of property while Hanigsberg uses the same film to discuss law's
unease with female desire. 16 Thelma and Louise serves as a vehicle to
explore outlaw culture and women as lawbreakers. 17 Sister My Sister and
Heavenly Creatures foster an exploration of the social representation of
lesbian criminality.' 8 Besieged becomes a vehicle for a discussion of the
treatment of selfless love within legal regimes. 19 Unforgiven is an explora-
tion of vengeance as a motivation of the informal legal regime;
20
Rashomon, A Question of Silence and Adam's Rib provide a means of
exploring the relationship between law, society and culture.
2 1
There is another body of writing on law and film which reports on the ped-
agogical deployment of film in the classroom. Some writers have discussed
their uses of film in the class as driven by pedagogical concerns, finding film
a helpful vehicle for exploring legal issues.22 Rosenberg, for example, writes
about using Casablanca as a manner of teaching law students about legal
pluralism and the conflict between various ethical systems,23 Meyer reports
on his use of film as a means of introducing outsider perspectives and
encouraging attention to legal imagination. 24 Sokolow discusses his use of
film in an attempt to have students think differently about "facts."
2 5
15 C. Menkel-Meadow, "The Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers: Lawyering in Literature,
Narratives, film and Television, and Ethical Choices Regarding Career and Craft,"(1999)
31 McGeorge L. Rev. 7.
16 A. Warner La Forest, "A Deceptive Cadence: Nineteenth-Century Property Law and Pop-
ular Culture's Perception of The Piano"(1995) 3 Can. J.L. & Soc. 31; J. Hanigsberg, "An
Essay on The Piano, Law, and the Search for Women's Desire"(1995) 3 Mich. J. of Gender
& Law 41.
17 E.V. Spelman, & M. Minow, "Outlaw Women: Thelma and Louise" in Legal Reelism,
supra note 8 at 261.
18 J. Millbank, "From Butch to Butcher's Knife: Film, Crime and Lesbian Sexuality"
(1996)18 Sydney L. Rev. 451 at 453.
19 A. Acorn, "Besieged By Beneficence: Love, Justice, and the Autonomous Self," (2000) 63
Sask.L.Rev. 69.
20 W.I. Miller, "Clint Eastwood and Equity: Popular Culture's Theory of Revenge" in A.
Sarat & T.R. Kearns, eds., Law in the Domains of Culture. (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1998) at 161.
21 See 0. Kamir, "Judgment By Film: Socio-Legal Functions of Rashomon." (2000) 12 Yale
J. L. & Humanities 39; and 0. Kamir, "X-Raying Adam's Rib: Multiple Readings of a
Feminist Law Film" (2000) 22 Stud. L., Pol. & Soc. 103-129. See also 0. Kamir, Every
Breath You Take: Stalking Narratives and the Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 2000).
22 A. Chase, "On Teaching Law and Popular Culture" (1998) 3 Focus on L. Stud. 1; S.
Greenfield & G. Osborn, "The Empowerment of Students: The Case for Popular Film in
Legal Studies" (1995) 10 Focus on L. Stud. 6.
23 N. Rosenberg, "A Word is Just a Word: Bringing Classical Hollywood Films into Legal
Studies Classes" (1992) 7 Focus on L. Stud. 2.
24 P.N. Meyer, "Law Students Go To the Movies" (1992) 24 Conn. L. Rev. 893; P.N. Meyer,
"Visual Literacy and the Legal Culture: Reading Film As Text in the Law School Setting"
(1993) 17 Leg. Stud. Forum 73.
25 D.S. Sokolow, "From Kurosawa to (Duncan) Kennedy: The Lessons of Rashomon for
Current Legal Education," (1991) Wisconsin L. Rev. 969.
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The reception of literature on law and film has been mixed. For some, it
seems little more than the logical extension of the law and literature move-
ment, which has emphasized the importance of attending to the Atories we
tell about law and the ways in which practices of storytelling are indeed
central to law itself. 26 Others have noted that law and film scholarship has
not drawn on film theory in quite the same way that law and literature schol-
ars have drawn on literary theory. Indeed, one might suggest that lawyers
often approach film without the kind of fear that they approach literature.
As Black puts it, one could observe that some law and film scholarship
would be inadequate as film scholarship per simpliciter. One might ask,
then, whether there is really much of value in the move to film? Why focus
on film and not just literature? Does a "law and film" combination simply
risk the creation of a category of scholarship that is simultaneously inade-
quate as either film or legal scholarship? Do legal scholars enter into the
cinema at their risk?
Black suggests that some of these kinds of critiques miss the point.
Scholarship in law and film is scholarship directed towards a specific pur-
pose-understanding (and even altering) the role of law in society. The
irony of this, Black suggests, is that:
[lit is easier for legal scholars to use films for pedagogical purposes than it is
for film scholars-a least the former have more of a purpose, with relation to
their professional activities, in doing so. In law, there is something at stake: it
really matters whether future lawyers, judges, and legislators have been
called upon (via film or otherwise) to reflect on certain matters.2 7
That is, in spite of the lack of fluency of many lawyers with film theory,
much of the writing on law and film is useful pedagogy within legal schol-
arship since legal scholarship struggles with the imperatives not only to
produce good scholarship, but also to engage with concrete practices of law
in the real world. We make this point out of a desire to encourage an open,
rather than fearful, response to the cinematic turn. At even the most surface
levels, looking at film can be a positive force, albeit at the level of encour-
aging students to think about the ways that stories about law influence the
ways they think about legal judgements. But we also want to suggest that
the legal scholar willing to work more deeply with film may find him or
herself tapping on some very rich resources.
III. ELEMENTS OF A CRITICAL CINEMATIC LEGAL METHOD
One of our aims in writing this paper was to examine more closely the
"gravitational pull" of film for legal scholars in an effort to break it down
into its constitutive elements. What are the aspects of film that can be use-
26 E.V. Giemmette, "Law and Literature: An Unnecessarily Suspect Class in the Liberal Arts
Component of the Law School Curriculum" (1989) 23 Valparaiso U. L. Rev. 267. Other law
school. Other law school symposia devoted to issues of popular culture include: (1989)
98(8) Yale L. J. [Popular Legal Culture]; (1994) 18(3) Vermont L. Rev. [Lawyers as Story-
tellers & Storytellers as Lawyers]; (1995) 10 Can. J. L. & Soc. [Law and Popular Culture].
27 Black, supra note 3 at 137.
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ful for legal scholars? We have suggested that law and film both function as
"arbiters of the social imaginary," that is, they participate in constructing
the social world in which we live. We turn to film, in part, because we sus-
pect that films may reveal aspects of this "constitutive" or meaning making
function that our own discipline tends to obscure. This paper seeks to look
more carefully at three such aspects: (1) the centrality of narrative (2) the
role of "brute perception" and (3) the implications of audience reception.
A. Narrative, Truth and Meaning in Film and Law
The first insight that we think film may hold for law relates to the consti-
tutive role of narrative. Narrative is one of the primary cognitive tools that
we use to make sense of the world. We use story to give meaning and
coherence to the events that we experience. The universal appeal of cinema
is built upon this narrative bedrock. Although, as we will see in the next
section, movies do more than simply tell a story, storytelling is a vital part
of what they do. The social power of films comes in part from this narrative
role. Looking at film also foregrounds the sometimes complicated relation-
ship between truth and fiction and reminds us of Benedict Anderson's
insight that "fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating
that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hall-
mark of modern nations."
28
In thinking about how narrative functions, we are drawn to ask whether
models of narrative should be thought of independently from the fact/fic-
tion distinction? For example, in a discussion of how children enter into
meaning through making narrative sense of the world, Jerome Bruner
observes that the power of a story does not necessarily depend on its truth/
fiction valence. At its heart, narrative is about the organization of experi-
ence. It is possible that the issue of truth vs. fiction might not be as central
to our understanding of the world as the structure of narrative itself
(regardless of truth or fictionality).29 Certainly, Bennett and Feldman's
research suggests that story structure is an essential explanatory variable in
social judgment processes.30 In our view, narrative structures play a crucial
28 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of National-
ism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991) at 36.
29 J. Bruner, Acts of Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). Bruner
suggests that narrative contains a particular structure, and that there are four constitutive
elements that must be present in this narrative structure (at 77):
Narrative requires ... four crucial grammatical constituents if it is to be effectively car-
ried out. It requires, first, a means for emphasizing human action or 'agentivity' - action
directed toward goals controlled by agents. It requires, secondly, that a sequential order
be established and maintained - that events and states be 'linearized' in a standard way.
Narrative, thirdly, also requires a sensitivity to what is canonical and what violates
canonicality in human interaction. Finally, narrative requires something approximating
a narrator's perspective: it cannot, in the jargon of narratology, be 'voiceless.'
30 W.L. Bennett & M.S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and
Judgment in American Culture (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1981) at
89. Indeed, where audiences are required to guess the truth of stories in contexts where
there is no guarantee that the teller is bound to tell the truth, guesses as to truth are as often
incorrect as correct. Their study showed that the structural integrity of a story was much
more closely related to its believability than factors related to the manner of storytelling
(i.e. length, actions, number or length of pauses).
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normative role in our society, one which is systematically overlooked by
traditional approaches to legal scholarship. Narrative functions as the arbi-
ter of social boundaries. Recognizable narrative structures define what is
canonized and what violates the canon in both the "cinematic" and the
"real" world.
Following these insights, there are good reasons to treat "fiction" as
something more than mere escapism or entertainment. As Ray puts it:
[I]n this century, the movies have provided their audience with some of the
most compelling, most abiding representations of the mental and physical
conditions of our lives. As an arena, the movies (and now their offspring,
television) have constituted the most visible site of an ideological struggle
waged for access to, and control of, these representations.
3
'
Indeed, over the past fifty years, film has provided the increasing bulk of
our society's stories. One reason that film can be a powerful tool for critical
methodology is that it provides an occasion to attend to the ways in which
fiction, with its representations, is crucial to community building and to our
conceptions of law and justice. Film is a site for the working through of
tensions over competing visions of justice and legality, such as The Man
Who Shot Liberty Valence,3 2 or in films in which law explicitly impedes the
just outcome, such as The Insider
The Insider is not unique among Hollywood films in its characterization
of the vexed relationship between law and justice. Indeed, as is clear in any
number of Grisham-based movies, law rarely operates in the movies as in
the positivist ideal that is taught in law schools. 33 However, The Insider
provides a further layer for analysis in its central consideration of the place
of "story" inside and outside the legal process. One could even suggest that
the star of The Insider is neither of the movie's two Hollywood "stars"-
the producer (Al Pacino) or the whistle blower (Russell Crowe)---but the
story itself. The role that the story will play in the film is illuminated in a
pivotal scene where the two main characters begin their complicated dance
with each other in the shadow of the law. Their first contact takes the form
31 R.B. Ray, A Certain Tendency of the Hollywood Cinema, 1930-1980 (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1985) at 21.
32 There is an extensive discussion of this particular tension in the American Western in Ray,
Ibid., particularly chapter 2: "Real and Disguised Westerns: Classic Hollywood's Varia-
tions of its Thematic Paradigm." See also C. Ryan, "Print the Legend: Violence and Rec-
ognition in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance," in Legal Reelism, supra note 8 at 23.
33 For an interesting discussion of the tensions exhibited in these "lawyer as superhero"
movies, see J. Grant, supra note 10. She argues that in these films, one sees a new set of
stories about the relationship of the "superhero" to the late 20th century mythological sys-
tems of reason and law. The superhero, endowed with ability and a willingness to do good,
is generally placed on the side of the law. This, however, is only true insofar as the legal
system is understood and portrayed as just. This relationship, she argues, "becomes unsta-
ble when the forces of evil appear to lurk within or even control the law and the state." (at
1111-1112). In these films, the hero eventually defeats the forces of evil (often using the
very tools of technological rationality deployed by the bad guys) by keeping sight of the
link between justice and reason. Indeed, at the heart of those particular stories is the need
for lawyers to be ferocious in the defence of justice.
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of an intense exchange of handwritten faxes: "I can't talk to you."; "Can't
Talk?, Won't Talk?, don't Want to Talk?"; "Can't, Won't, Don't Want To."
In this scene we learn that narrative is never simply given or received; it is
constructed within a world of complex constraints and possibilities, includ-
ing legal constraints and the threat of legal punishments.
The insider's story, interestingly, is both absolutely central to the film
and rendered opaque to it. That is, the film is all about "getting the story
out" and yet in the film, the "story"-that is, the interview with the
insider-is only revealed in soundbite-like fragments, repeated with the
same poignant soundtrack, at strategic moments in the film. 34 The audience
is presumed to be able to "read in" the missing text. Tellingly, the film's
normative foundation, the "truth" of the insider's story, is left textually
indeterminate.
1. Narrative Truth/Historical Truth
The limits of law in grappling with the normative power of narrative are
further revealed in the useful distinction between narrative truth and histor-
ical truth drawn by Donald Spence:
Narrative truth can be defined as the criterion we use to decide when a cer-
tain experience has been captured to our satisfaction; it depends on continu-
ity and closure, and the extent to which the fit of the pieces take on an
aesthetic finality. Narrative truth is what we have in mind when we say that
such and such is a good story, that a given explanation carries conviction,
that one solution to a mystery must be true.
35
In contrast, historical truth is time-bound and dedicated to correspon-
dance rules. Historical truth tries to approximate what actually happened.
Problems arise, according to Spence, when the two types of truth are con-
flated, as they frequently are in the process of analysis. Narrative truth, the
truth of a well told story, is the type of truth that conveys meaning. Histori-
cal truth, on the other hand, or the truth of events as they actually hap-
pened, is both confusing and elusive. Although Freud insisted that the aim
of his method of free association was to allow patient and analyst to get to
the "historical truth" of a life, Spence argued that the real power of the talk-
ing cure comes from its meaning-making function; the ability of the analyst
to assist the individual in producing a coherent narrative, a story that makes
sense of that person's life. Whether or not the story is "true" in a referential
sense, that is, whether it is an accurate reflection of actual events in that
person's life, is of secondary importance.
A similar conflation of these two types of truth happens in law. That is,
the positivist conception of law presumes that the legal system is designed
34 This deployment of sound in this manner in this particular film is hardly surprising. The
film is directed by Michael Mann, famous for his use of music to convey emotional mood
and truth in the much watched Miami Vice television series.
35 D.P. Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psycho-
analysis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982) at 31.
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to allow us to most closely approximate the historical truth of an event.
That is, once all the evidence is in, the judge and/or jury are in the best pos-
sible position to be able to say what actually happened. Law/film scholars
such as Richard Sherwin, however, have pointed out (and good trial attor-
neys have long known) that in the adversarial setting of the courtroom it is
most often narrative truth that prevails.36 That is, the better story, the one
that ties up the most loose ends, the one that makes sense to the decision-
makers and that conforms with narrative expectations, is the one most
likely to be believed.
The relationship between narrative and justice is clearly problematized
by Errol Morris's documentary film, The Thin Blue Line. It is a film that
carefully examines the circumstances surrounding the conviction of a
Texas death row inmate for the murder of a police officer. The film
prompted a re-examination of the conviction by the courts and the eventual
release of the convicted man. The Thin Blue Line, however, is more inter-
esting for its methods than its eventual consequences. The movie reveals
the way in which competing narratives function in the operation of the jus-
tice system by re-enacting the events of the night of the murder from the
perspective of each of the witnesses, in turn effectively "fictionalizing" a
series of accounts that each purport to be the "truth" of the matter. Some,
like Sherwin, have suggested that Errol Morris's film is, in this respect,
truly postmodern in its embrace of the relationship between available alter-
native versions of a story and the subject position of the teller. That is, they
suggest that he is telling us that in the end we can't know who killed the
police officer. And yet the film clearly comes down in favour of the wrong-
fully convicted accused. Morris himself has said of the film, "I wanted to
make a movie about how truth was difficult to know, not impossible to
know."37 The insight about the power of narrative that Morris so effectively
reveals in his film has deeply troubling consequences for law, so troubling
that even he is reluctant to embrace them.
Law continues to conflate narrative truth and historical (correspondence)
truth for good reasons. The alternative is profoundly destabilizing.
Acknowledging the power of narrative truth in the courtroom and its pull
on legal decision-makers means also giving up on the notion that legal
truth is singular. That is, that there is one right answer, one just result. Once
one enters the realm of narrative truth, it is necessary to acknowledge the
possibility of available alternative tellings of the story. Despite its implica-
tions, we argue, the power of narrative truth should not be overlooked.
Rather, we need to spend more time developing the tools for understanding
the ways that narrative pulls on our imaginations, the kinds of stories that
structure the world we inhabit and how those stories play a role inside legal
institutions.
36 See P.N. Meyer, "'Desperate for Love': Cinematic Influences upon a Defendant's Closing
Argument to a Jury" (1994) 18 Vermont L. Rev. 721; P.N. Meyer, "'Desperate for Love I1':
Further Reflections on the Interpenetration of Legal and Popular Storytelling in Closing
Arguments to a Jury in a Complex Criminal Case" (1996) 30 U. of San Francisco L. Rev.
931. See also Bennett and Felman, supra note 30; Sherwin, supra notes 14.
37 Sherwin, supra note 4.
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Of course, film is not the only source of social narratives. Literature has
long been a powerful source of storytelling. Certainly the law and literature
movement has provided a significant foundation for the work that has been
done to date on law and film. An understanding of the narrative techniques
at work within literature can certainly sharpen one's approach to other
forms of fiction. However, though the techniques of cinema are no less
ingenious than those of literary narrative, we agree with Black that many
discussions of narrative and narrativity do seem to privilege written forms.
This is so despite the fact that there is no reason to presume that written
narrative is the locus of the powerful grasp that storytelling has on the
social imagination. Narrative also exists in oral cultures beyond the tech-
nologizing power of the written word. 38 Indeed, there is evidence which
strongly suggests that narrative, "the kind of storytelling so central to
human existence," is something acquired by children long before they have
words. 39 They learn about narrative in a context where perception is the
guiding force (seeing, touching, hearing, smelling, etc.) As we examine in
the following section, film may be a valuable tool for understanding how
narrative works precisely because it captures these pre-linguistic elements
of brute perception.
B. Cinema and the World of Perception
Much of the current writing in film and law has focused on the story at
the heart of the film; much less attention has been paid to specifically cine-
matic elements in film.40 Thus, is it often the case that a plot summary is
thought to be sufficient to let the reader know what is going on in a film.
But while film and literature share many common concerns and some com-
mon techniques, film is not simply a (lesser) subset of literature. The cine-
matic turns attention to certain features of lived experience in a manner
distinct from literary forms. Consider Andrew's comment on Jean Mitry's
theory of film:
[Cinema] is the art in which our mute perceptions take on meaning and
value. If the novel makes us feel the interdependence of man and man or of
men and the world, it does so abstractly, through words and figures of
speech; film, on the other hand, does so through the normal process of brute
perception.4 '
Part of what is potentially interesting about the methodological turn to
film may be the ability to access just those cinematic elements, elements
which work through the normal process of brute perception.42 Certainly
film engages us in the world of perception: we see things, and we hear
38 See W.J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: the Technologizing of the Word (London: Routledge,
1988).
39 Bruner, supra note 29.
40 Some notable exceptions include Meyer, supra note 14; and Kamir, supra note 21.
41 iD. Andrew, The Major Film Theories (London: Oxford University Press, 1976) at 208.
42 Black, supra note 3 at 131-32.
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things. In exploring the narrative in any given film, it is useful to supple-
ment a discussion of plot with an exploration of the significance of cine-
matic elements such as lighting, camera angles and focal lengths, shot
duration, editing, diegetic and extra diegetic sound.43 Each of these factors
has implications for the ways in which brute perceptions come to hold
meaning.44 Lighting not only permits us to see the action, but creates a
sense of space and mood, and guides our attention to certain objects and
actions. Angles and focal lengths modify perspective in ways which dis-
tinctly affect the spectator's experience. 45 Camera orientation plays an
important role in encouraging certain kinds of experience. Deep focus
shots allow for greater spectator detachment, while more subjective camera
angles can pull the viewer into closer identification with specific charac-
ters. 46 Most certainly, anyone who has had the experience of watching a
horror film with the sound turned down is aware of the role of extra-
diegetic sound in creating the experience of fear. The Insider provides a
clear example of the importance of the aural to the filmic experience. Dur-
ing the scene where the insider gives his interview to the producer, Lisa
Gerrard's haunting vocals play in the background, increasing one's sense of
unease and conveying a sense of the threat or danger, though there is noth-
ing visually dangerous in the scene. It is the music which carries the weight
of conveying a sense of gravity and danger.
As an example of the perceptual power of the cinematic, consider the
opening moments in Joel Schumacher's controversial 1992 film Falling
Down.47 The film follows a man (known by his personalized license plate,
"D-FENS") who abandons his car on a gridlocked Los Angeles freeway
and begins a cross-city trek on foot, trying to get home for his daughter's
birthday. His quest for home spirals into an increasingly violent rampage,
culminating in a Western-like show-down between D-FENS (played by
43 Diegetic sound is that coming from within the story world. It may be external (dialogue
between characters, lawnmowers running, a record playing while a couple dance) or inter-
nal (the voice-over of Harrison Ford in Blade Runner, giving us access to the internal
world of a character in the fictional world). Extra-diegetic sound is that added to the film,
by way of soundtrack, mood music, sound emanating from outside the film's fictional
world. See generally, D. Bordwell & K. Thompson, Film Art: An Introduction, 5th ed
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), c. 9.
44 For a good introduction to the techniques of cinema, see Bordwell & Thompson, ibid.
45 For example by distorting objects or characters, transforming scale or depth via zoom
shots. For an interesting catalogue of examples, see Bordwell & Thompson, supra note 43
at 216-226.
46 And, indeed, the director may occasionally use both kinds of angles to allow for a very
specific kind of experience. For example Ray notes that in The Godfather, when Michael
kills Sollozzo, the scene shots alternate between point of view shots (identifying the
viewer with Michael) and objective long shots (frozen tableaus encouraging estrange-
ment). This technique allows the scene to be both involving and repellant, to make the
viewer want the murder to happen, and yet feel appalled when it does. See Ray, supra note
31, at 336-339.
47 There is some very thoughtful literature on this movie from film theorists. In particular,
see Carol Clover, "White Noise" (1993) 3 Sight and Sound 6; J. Davies, "'I'm the bad
guy?': Falling Down and White Masculinity in 1990s Hollywood," (1995) 4.J. of Gender
Stud. 145; F. Pfeil, White Guys: Studies in Postmodern Domination and Difference (Lon-
don: Verso, 1995) at 238-243; J.P. Telotte, "Definitely-Falling-Down," (1996) 24 J. of
Popular Film & Television 19.
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Michael Douglas) and on-the-verge-of-retirement cop, Prendergast (played
by Robert Duvall). The film is complex, as is the film's stance with respect
to Douglas-are we or are we not supposed to identify with him? While a
person may or not "choose" to identify with Douglas, in the opening min-
utes of the film, a combination of cinematic elements (diegetic and extra-
digetic sound, closeups, increasingly rapid editing) encourages identifica-
tion with Douglas by pulling the viewer deeply into his subjective world.
How does the film do this?
The movie opens with a black screen and silence, except for the sound of
someone breathing in and out. As the darkness dissipates, the camera
comes in directly below a man's sweaty face, shifting upwards to give up a
full screen closeup of Michael Douglas's face-close enough to be uncom-
fortable. He is looking straight ahead, his face is beaded with sweat and all
we can hear is the overpowering sound of his laboured breathing. Gradu-
ally, the focus opens out, and we see that he is sitting in the driver's seat of
a car trapped in traffic on a hot summer day. As he pushes at the console,
we understand that the air conditioning is not working. Nor does the win-
dow of the car open. The only sound we hear is still the overpowering
sound of his rather laboured breathing. We also hear a fly, buzzing around
the car, occasionally settling on the back of Douglas's neck. Traffic noises
slowly start to build. As they do, using shot-reverse-shot sequences and
point of view camera work, we are taken rapidly back and forth from Dou-
glas's eyes to what he is seeing and hearing: other cars, children hanging
out of bus windows, people yelling into phones and cursing. Gradually,
these noises from outside grow louder and louder, the sound of a fly buzz-
ing around in the car is amplified and a pulsing beat (extra-diegetic)
increases in both volume and pulse. The shots increase in rapidity, flicking
from closeups of Michael Douglas to the other cars and their occupants,
billboards and bumperstickers in an increasingly rapid fire motion, until
finally Douglas forces open the door of his car and scrambles out. At this
point, the sound and rapid fire editing return to normal and the viewer is
left with the same sense of having escaped a claustrophobic hole. While it
is too early in the film to say that one "identifies" with Douglas, the viewer
has been given a nearly visceral experience, based primarily on the manip-
ulation of brute perceptions.
In a scene like the above, the visual and aural play important mutually
reinforcing roles. Certainly, in film, sound and image are deployed together
as guarantors of two radically different modes of knowing: the seeming
concreteness of the visible is conducive to an ideology of empiricism,
while the ineffable, intangible quality of sound places it on the side of the
emotional or intuitive.48 The co-presence of these two forms of knowing,
Doane argues, opens up the possibility of exposing an ideological fissure-
of pointing out the irreconcilability of these two forms of truth. However,
as she points out, if done right, film does not separate "I see" from the "I
48 M.A. Doane, "Ideology and the Practice of Sound Editing and Mixing," in T. de Lauretis
& S. Heath, eds., The Cinematic Apparatus (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980) 47 at 50.
Vol. 20
Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Justice
hear." Instead, "there is the I feel, I experience, through the grand-total of
picture and track combined., 49 And in the world of law, the power of this
combination is at the base of the view that one should not lightly overturn
the findings of a trier of fact: the combination of "I see" and "I hear" is
thought to provide a more powerful sense of truth than is possible in the
world of analytic thought detached from the concrete world of "I feel, I
experience." The trier of fact is thought to be best situated to judge the
truth/credibility of events because the trier of fact experiences the testi-
mony through the normal processes of brute perception. The cinematic
may play an important role in courtroom credibility issues, in alternative
dispute resolution models, in mediation and in lawyer/client meetings. 5
For those interested in the intersection of law and film, an analysis of
visual images may require a manner of reading different from that required
for the study of written texts. As Bill Nichols notes, the visual has a certain
"indexical wham" that makes it seem as if visuals can easily be read off
their surfaces.5' However, when using film, it is often necessary to spend
time pushing past this notion. Visual texts are deceptive and are not so eas-
ily read off their surfaces. While the visual may seem to more powerfully
approach something like reality, the visual is a text which derives its mean-
ing in dialectic with the viewer.52 Indeed, the complexity of the relationship
between the image and the viewer is painfully evident in disparities
between different groups viewing the Rodney King videotapes. 53 That is,
to say that film can create the experience of "I feel, I experience" is not to
say that film simply reflects the 'real.' 54 What film has at its disposal is
access to a range of techniques that can create the impression of an unmedi-
ated access to an existing reality. We emphasize the word "impression"
49 Ibid.
50 See Meyer, supra note 36.
51 F.P. Tomasulo, "'1'll See it When I Believe it': Rodney King and the Prison-House of
Video" in Sobchack, supra note 5, 69 at 71. Tomasulo attributes the phrase to Bill Nichols,
in a paper titled, "A Visible Evidence," Tomasulo, ibid. at n. 10. In his book, Blurred
Boundaries, supra note 5 at ix, Nichols says, "I use indexical to refer to signs that bear a
physical trace of what they refer to, such as the fingerprint, X ray, or photograph."
52 Spence, supra note 35, points out this in his discussion of the meaning of dreams, a form
which is similarly in the realm of the visual.
53 Tomasulo, supra note 51. See also J. Fiske, "Admissible Postmodernity: Some Remarks
on Rodney King, O.J. Simpson, and Contemporary Culture" (1996) 30 U. of San Fran-
cisco L. Rev. 917; Nichols, supra note 5, particularly chapter 2: "The Trials and Tribula-
tions of Rodney King."
54 Certainly, part of the debate between formalist and realist schools of film theory centred
on this very question. The formalist assertion that film was unable to perfectly imitate nor-
mal visual experience was linked to their argument that the limitations of film defined its
expressive potential, giving the film maker an opportunity to use film's specific properties
[editing, montage, etc.] to manipulate and distort our everyday experience of reality for
artistic ends. The realists, on the other hand, argued that film's ability to mechanically
record allowed it to perfectly imitate our normal visual experience of reality and that it
was this ability to imitate reality that defined film as art. These debates primarily con-
cemed the question of whether and why film was "art." Certainly, there would have been
agreement across both schools of thought that the range of cinematic techniques give film
the capacity both to record and distort experience. See W. Buckland, Film Studies (Lon-
don: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998) at 20-21. For a discussion of the theories underpinning
formalism and realism, see Andrew, supra note 41 at c. 1- 2.
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since it has long been clear that there is no unmediated access to any exist-
ing reality: the "normal processes of ,brute perception" are, of course, them-
selves shaped by many factors including gender, race, class and personal
history.
The point of interest for scholars of law and film is not that film gives
some more objective, unmediated, pure access to truth. The point is rather
that cinematic techniques allow film to appear somewhat like life.55 This
fact is both useful and dangerous. We rely on experience to make sense of
the world. Filmic re-creations of experience can be profoundly influential
because they can take one through a variety of situations, to explore what it
might feel like to live a different kind of life. The "I feel, I experience" pos-
sible in film can lead one to identify with marginalized groups, to under-
stand the suffering of the victimized. But it can also lead one to sympathize
with a victimizer, or to participate in the scapegoating of outsider groups.
56
There are clear dangers in an approach which deconstructs the ways in
which film attempts to construct a certain kind of response. However, it
also seems indisputable that in film, as in life, brute perceptions are them-
selves mediated. Film provides a valuable (if also dangerous) mechanism
for exploring the ways in which perceptions are mediated by that which we
"know" or "believe" about the world. This, of course, leads us to a third
issue in the study of law and film: the question of audience response.
C. Audience Response / Postmodernism and Legitimacy
Cinema gains its power in part from its ability to engage more directly
with the world of perceptions. But this engagement is never unmediated
and this was well understood by even early film theorists. So, for example,
while Sergei Eisenstein believed that shots could provoke reactions in
spectators, he did not see the shots themselves as anything as simple as
reflections of reality. Further, he did not see meaning as simply resident in
those shots. On the contrary, for him, "In film the senses perceive attrac-
tions, but cinematic meaning is generated only when the mind leaps to their
comprehension by attending to the collision of those attractions."5 7 Put
55 It is in this respect that film can prove so valuable as a pedagogical tool. It allows one to
begin with a "common experience" that includes visual and aural coding and then go
through the process of asking about how the film constructs knowledge and shapes the
experience and relies on codes and cues about appropriate ways of explaining the world. In
some ways, it makes possible in the classroom the kind of leaming people often have in their
"real lives,"-that is, the phenomenon of having an experience, giving one set of meanings
to that experience and later reconstructing the experience or situating it differently in the
context of other knowledge. In the film context, one can have a certain experience and then
concretely move through it, exploring both competing interpretations and the role of con-
ventions and cues in the construction of that experience. It is to practice the application of
critical skills in contexts that seem to have a closer experience to everyday experience than
do traditional texts. In the process, it may be easier to draw connections between the life of
the law as seen in the text and the life of the law as a lived social experience.
56 There is certainly an extensive literature dealing with the portrayal of Jews and other mar-
ginalized groups in Nazi propaganda films. See also C. Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal
History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950 (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian .Legal
History, 1999). She discusses the ways in which Griffith's racist film Birth of a Nation was
used as a tool of recuitment by the Klu Klux Klan, both in the U.S. and in Canada.
57 Supra note 41 at 52.
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another way, "film is not a product but an organically unfolding creative
process in which the audience participates both emotionally and intellectu-
ally."58 Using shots and montage to piece together fragments engaging the
brute sensations of perception, the spectator (for Eisenstein) is given not a
complete image, but the experience of completing an image. In this art, he
argued, we are "... led away from logic to re-experience our primary mode
of understanding.
'
"
59
In exploring the cinematic, we have occasion to explore the ways in
which our "primary mode of understanding" is very much mediated. What
we see and hear is influenced by what we already know. As Ray notes, in
the film world, the relationship between the "real" and the "perceived" is a
complex one:
[lI]n Althusser's terms, the American Cinema has never reflected 'real'
events but at most its audience's relation to those events, and, as I have
argued, that relation has at no point been free of cultural conditioning. That
is, the very categories of perception that constitute the audience's relation to
the material events themselves derive overwhelmingly from the culture that
purports merely to reflect them.
6°
Further, as the example of the Rodney King tapes made painfully evi-
dent, visual images do not speak for themselves. One must account for
questions of audience response: how does the experience of the viewer
shape what is seen? As Tomasulo puts it: "people generally do not come to
believe things after seeing them; they see things only when they already
believe them ... ,,. 6 This is not to say that response is arbitrary, but it is to
suggest that it is not fixed. Indeed, it is to suggest that questions concerning
audience response might have a central role to play in understanding narra-
tives about truth and justice. At minimum, it suggests that questions of
audience response might be at least as important (if not more important)
than questions of authorial intention in determining what a particular narra-
tive means.
62
The Godfather provides an interesting example of the ways in which
questions of authorial intention can fail to account for the social impact of a
given cultural text.63 It appears that Coppola saw his trilogy as a demythol-
ogizing challenge to understandings of the U.S. as a pluralistic society liv-
58 Ibid. at 66-7.
59 Ibid. at 74.
60 Ray, supra note 31 at 364.
61 Tomasulo, supra note 51 at 82.
62 As cultural theorists have pointed out too often, researchers have focused on the content of
media messages without taking into account the complex ways in which audiences inter-
act with those messages. See R. Brunt, "Engaging with the Popular: Audiences for Mass
Culture and What to Say About Them" in L. Grossberg, C. Nelson & P.A. Treichler, eds.,
Cultural Studies (New York: Routledge, 1992) at 69. See also J. Fiske, Television Culture
(London: Routledge, 1987), and D. Morley, The Nationwide Audience: Structure and
Decoding (London: British Film Institute, 1980).
63 See D.R. Papke,"Myth and Meaning: Francis Ford Coppola and Popular Response to the
Godfather Trilogy" in Legal Reelism, supra note 8 at 1.
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ing by the rule of law. He offered the Corelone mafia family as a symbol
for a lawless and criminal America. Instead, and to Coppola's frustration, it
was commonly read as valorizing the mythic family and the legend of the
self made man, and as endorsing authoritarian power as an alternative to
legalism. Despite Coppola's intentions as the director, the film ultimately
had a very different meaning for the public than the meaning he had
intended. The point Papke notes is, that:
[C]ultural artifacts are not simply containers into which writers, composers,
and directors pour meanings that will later be drained by readers, listeners,
and viewers ... . Viewers bring their own tastes, values, and histories to the
films, and meanings emerge from the interaction of the film and the viewer's
responses to it.
64
Although it seems clear enough that spectators can use film for purposes
other than those the maker intended, Bordwell notes that cinematic interpre-
tation has tended to focus more on the practices of production than on those
of reception. 65 This is no less true of law. Legal interpreters and legal peda-
gogues have focussed much more intensely on questions concerning the
practices of producing law than on questions of the law's reception.
66
Indeed, whether central or not, questions of audience response are often
side-stepped by those concerned with questions of legal and cinematic inter-
pretation. In some ways this is not surprising, given the complexities of
determining how an audience makes use of a cultural text (be it a TV pro-
gram, a film, or a legal judgment). 67 However, this inattention has real impli-
cations for our understanding of the complex ways in which both law and
cinema function as interpreters and mediators of our social world. We argue
that it is important to take seriously the widespread inattention to questions
of audience. This inattention may not simply be a function of the difficulty
of assessing response, but may also be evidence of a more deep-seated anx-
iety about its implications. Once one begins to take seriously the notion of
audience response (including the notion that what is seen depends very much
on who is doing the seeing), one has to confront the depth of the postmodern
challenge to the modernist notion that truth is knowable and simply waiting
to be found. Within the discipline of law one finds a powerful will to affirm
the modernist vision that the truth is singular and can be discovered.68
64 Ibid. at 17-18.
65 D. Bordwell, Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation of Cinema
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) at 270.
66 In his discussion of legal scholarship on film, Black supra note 3 at 115, identifies a ten-
dency in scholarship on law and film (and law and literature, for that matter) to ignore (or
simply be unaware of) issues of meaning, authorial intention and reader response.
67 See e.g. the discussion in R. Brunt, "Engaging with the Popular: Audiences for Mass Cul-
ture and What to Say about Them," in L. Grossberg, C. Nelson & P.A. Treichler, eds., Cul-
tural Studies (New York: Routledge, 1992) at 69.
68 N.K. Denzin, Images of Postmodern Socitey: Social Theory and Contemporary Cinema
(London: Sage, 1991) at 10: Contemporary cinema perpetuates modernist impulses
(auteurism, social realism, genre-driven productions such as comedies, cop-mystery thrill-
crs, musicals, westems, biographies) punctuated by periodic postmodem breaks with the
past. Also see Ray, supra note 31.
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One might argue that cinema is less driven by this modernist vision than
is law.69 In the world of film, despite the indexical wham, it is easier to
acknowledge the ways in which the film has an author and the author has a
perspective. But Black would suggest that the strength of the modernist
will to believe in an extant truth is also evident in the world of cinematic
criticism. Much film criticism, Black argues, could be appropriately
labelled "forensic criticism": assertions that the film "got it wrong." He
argues that while such criticism may seem to wrest narrative power from
the film-maker it does not; the right to contest what the film narrates is sim-
ply a part of the pact in which film is given the power to narrate. The right
to contest is, he argues, a pacifier rather than a weapon. Indeed, to the
extent that it reinforces the notion of a right answer, forensic criticism may
be evidence of the impotence of responsive power to regimes of represen-
tation. 70 Forensic criticism, he argues, provides little more than diversions
which "serve as decoys away from what might otherwise develop into a
more penetrating demystification of film or unmasking of its constructive
strategies." 7 1 As he illustrates:
[T]he very act of condemning a film for having gotten something wrong
implies that it might have gotten the thing right-which, in turn, implies that
the difference between reality and representation is quantifiable, describable,
and-given the right kind and degree of textual tinkering-reducible to
zero.
7 2
That is, forensic criticism tends to reinforce the notion that there is a right
answer or a right film out there-it is just a matter of getting the details
right.
Black's discussion of forensic criticism in film certainly resonates with a
great deal of legal criticism. At the centre of the legal enterprise is a story
which holds law to be primarily about the pursuit of truth. A legal case,
done well, attempts to provide an objective recital of a series of events.
Thus, in the realm of legal criticism, attention is often directed to errors:
the ways in which the judge or jury "got it wrong." In law, some of the
debates are about accurate constructions of reality. Sometimes, the diffi-
culty in challenging a position is that debate flounders on the question of
"what really happened." Criticism of a case is often based on assertions
about what was wrong, implying that a right answer was available if only
someone had been brave enough to give it, or if evidence had not been
69 Certainly, while the trial process is often said to be about the discovery of truth, film often
has a different explicit aim. In the real of social drama, certainly, the concern is less with
events as markers of the real than with the different interpretations put upon those events,
and the ways in which these interpretations give subtle expression to divergent interests or
switches in the balance of power. See, J. Staiger, "Cinematic Shots: The Narration of Vio-
lence" in Sobchack, supra note 5 at 39.
70 In the context of law, a similar argument is made about the limits to the ability of outsider
groups to use the law for social change. See Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law
(London: Routledge, 1989).
71 Black, supra note 3 at 147.
72 Black, supra note 3 at 154.
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destroyed or if justice had not been subverted for someone's personal gain
or because of someone's prejudice or bias.
Forensic criticism, to the extent that it reinforces the notion that there is a
right answer somewhere out there, fails to deal with the more difficult
insights of postmodern understandings, and with the issues of narrative,
perception and audience response discussed above. The insights above
pose a challenge to the notion that the relationship between reality and rep-
resentation is perfectly quantifiable, and thus to the notion (in Fox Mul-
der's language) that "the truth is out there." This challenge, in the realm of
law, is a serious challenge indeed.
IV. CONCLUSION: TAKING THE TIGER BY THE TAIL
"It's not that everything is bad, it's that everything is dangerous,
which is not exactly the same as bad."'73 - Foucault
The postmodern world in which we live mounts an undeniable challenge
to law. It does so by challenging law's ability to reach the "truth" of the
matter, to find closure, to "do justice" with any kind of certainty at all. As
Richard Sherwin and others have suggested, The Thin Blue Line, as a docu-
mentary film that makes extensive use of "fictional" film-making tech-
niques, perfectly illustrates our current dilemma. In addition to the
mesmerizing repetitive soundtrack mentioned earlier, the filmmaker uses
the juxtaposition of visual images, like the tail-lights of various models of
cars, as well as numerous dramatized re-enactments of the crime to destabi-
lize any confidence we might have had in a single eyewitness account. The
film reveals a world in which all of the narrators are unreliable, leaving the
viewer caught in a maze of contradictory accounts and conflicting motiva-
tions. It seems impossible to say for certain what happened on the night the
police officer was killed.74
This conclusion has potentially devastating consequences for law. It
appears to justify a retreat to cynicism and despair. Certainly, there is some
evidence that this sense of cynicism is already evident both in the public
73 H.L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) quoting M. Foucault:
"No! I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the
solution of anther problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I
want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the
word "alternative." I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of problematiques.
My point is not that everything is bad but that everything is dangerous, which is not
exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to
do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. I think
that the ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the
main danger."
74 While many scholarly commentators on the film would agree with the statement, as we
have noted earlier, Errol Morris himself suggested otherwise: "I wanted to make a film
about how truth was difficult to know, not impossible to know." Charles Musser, "Film
Truth, Documentary, and the Law: Justice at the Margins" (1996) 30 U. of San Francisco
L.Rev. [Symposium: Picturing Justice: Images of Law and Lawyers in the Visual Media]
963 at 975.
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perception of law and within law schools. Philip Meyer, reporting on his
use of film in the classroom, notes that "passivity, detachment, cynicism
and I fear, resentment and anger, are also deeply ingrained features of the
new visual literacy." 75 His students revealed cynicism about the nature of
the legal profession and the limited possibilities for justice in law.
Richard Sherwin agrees that the spirit of postmodernism pervades the
period of time in which we live, but also suggests that its impact is not
monolithic. He distinguishes two streams. The first, "skeptical postmod-
ernism," denies the very possibility of knowing truth or reality, claiming
that there is simply no "there" to know. But the life of this form of post-
modernism is one of anomie, brittle laughter and despair about the world
we inhabit. 76 It is, he argues, "a life that cannot be lived.",77 In particular, it
is not a life that can be lived within the law, where there is a need for judg-
ment, a need to reach particular outcomes in particular cases and the need
for belief to sustain the meanings that legal stories and arguments call to
mind for the sake of judgment. Accordingly, Sherwin suggests that the law
is no place for the skeptical postmodernist viewpoint, which requires us to
watch it all with a frightening irony or a bemused detachment.
In the alternative, Sherwin offers what he now calls the "affirmative
postmodern" position. Those operating from within the spirit of this form
of postmodernism see that knowledge is constructed, but remain believers
in the substance of certain images, feelings, myths and dramatic forms as a
way of hooking us into particular ways of seeing, thinking and feeling
about ourselves and others and events around us.78 The point is not to deny
that meaning is constructed, but rather to ask more questions about how
that process of construction happens. It is to acknowledge that internal
forces like the drive for meaning can still account for events in our social
world. This approach is close to something he calls "tragic wisdom":
Unlike skeptical postmodernism, tragic wisdom seeks to go beyond the criti-
cal capacity to recognize the rhetorical (or aesthetic) forms of cultural and
cognitive meaning making. It also seeks to cultivate our capacity for
enchantment, the ability to feel and affirm the normative force of meaning's
appeal. This is what it means to accept the responsibility of a mature as
opposed to naive constructionism.
79
A parallel argument in the world of film is provided by eminent film the-
orist David Bordwell. He mounts a call for a "historical poetics" of film, an
approach which shifts both the goals and methods of film theory. Rather
than asking how a film provides an occasion to entertain the juxtaposition
and development of semantic fields (the critic using those fields to build up
75 VisualLiteracy, supra note 24 at 893.
76 A similar argument about the difficulty of finding the space for living between anomie and
rigidity is made in Windisch, Uli. Speech and Reasoning in Everyday Life. trans. by I.
Patterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1990).
77 Narrative Construction, supra note 14 at 708.
78 Narrative Construction, supra note 14 at 693.
79 Sherwin, supra note 4 at 230.
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meanings), he suggests that there are more interesting questions, such as
"How are particular films put together?" and "What effects and functions
do particular films have?" Bordwell's approach accounts for the "undeni-
able power of social agents to make and execute plans," but also makes us
look to aspects of the film shaped by the "invisible hand" of larger social
forces.
' 's
°
We agree. Not only do we think it is important to understand the social
effects and functions of film, we think we can use film and film theory to
help us understand how to unpack these things and transfer this knowledge
over to the legal context. Undoubtedly, all visual readers are not equally
familiar with the tools of cinematic persuasion, but we do think that film
offers a non-threatening way to expose these tools as tools. Using film, it is
possible to approach a text without an emotional load and to ask a series of
questions. How does the film do what it does? How is the story arranged?
What details are foregrounded, and what pieces of information left unsaid?
What angles are used, and what perspectives are we shown (e.g. do we see
with an objective camera or point of view? Are we seeing through the eyes
of a specific character?) Once these tools are developed in the context of
film, they can be easily transposed to a legal context. That is, a person can
now ask similar questions of legal texts. Such questions are of course not
new. There is a long tradition of legal scholarship concerned with the con-
struction of reality through the admission, exclusion and interpretation of
facts.
In this way, our juxtaposition of film and law, rather than leading to a
position of cynicism or despair, can suggest a new range of questions about
meaning and truth in law. What is important for us is the particular ways in
which truth and justice are understood in the classroom, courtroom, cham-
bers as well as in the wider public sphere. The critical cinematic methods
we have outlined give us some tools by which to try to understand the
mechanisms and processes by which legal truths are constructed, con-
strained, contested and conjured. We can then take those tools and ask
questions about the legal world. How do available narratives operate to
amplify the veracity of a particular account? When are they drawn upon
and to what ends? How does the "indexical wham" of brute perception
work for a trial judge hearing a witness? In what ways do the uses of new
media in the courtroom mimic the techniques of advertisers? Should these
correspondences trouble us? How can we better integrate a range of per-
spectives regarding the "justice" of the legal system in particular cases? As
hopeful pragmatists, we think that better understandings of these mecha-
nisms will enable us to work collectively toward more just outcomes, even
in a world of unreliable narrators and competing truths.
As Sherwin points out, these processes of meaning making are at the
core of what we need to understand about how law and popular culture ref-
erence and influence one another. Recognizing the synchonicities of law
and popular culture, at one level, is simply an acknowledgement that there
80 Bordwell & Thompson, supra note 43 at 269-272.
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is always going to be a mythic element to our constructions of the world,
what Sherwin refers to as forms of enchantment. Law is undeniably caught
up in this mythic, world-making aspect of our ongoing collective project of
constructing social meaning, so it is impossible to claim or reclaim for it
some place of rationality apart from or above the (pop-cultural) fray.
We are all engaged in the mythic processes of world-making, 81 no less as
lawyers, law teachers and judges than as film-makers. Struggles over
meaning, shifting social roles and expectations get played out in films and
in courtrooms every day. Learning how to unpack the interweave of truth,
justice and narrative might help us to see how law comes to recognize
some emerging claims for justice while dismissing others.
81 Supra, note 1.
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